Fiscal Policy and the Saving Glut of the Rich by Bianchi, Ceneri, Melosi, and Villa

Discussion by

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New Challenges for Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions Sveriges Riksbank, October 6-7th, 2025

The Paper in a Nutshell

- In post 1980s US
 - "Saving glut of the rich": ↑ savings of rich, ↑ debt of middle class
 - ↑ federal fiscal transfers and federal debt, ↓ inflation
- Unified explanation: structural change in fiscal revenue policy
 - pre 1980s: unfunded transfers, fiscal inflation, low debt
 - post 1980s: transfers funded by progressive taxes, accounts for
 - distributional patterns of household debt & savings
 - o federal debt rise
 - "conquest of American inflation"

Great paper! I learned a lot

A Sketch of the Simple Model

Two-Agent New-Keynesian model

- Househods supply labour, consume, pay taxes/receive transfers
 - Poor trade household debt
 - Rich trade household debt (w/ frictions) + govt debt + firm shares
- Firms are standard and face price adjustment costs á la Rotemberg
- F borrows and sets taxes/transfers s.t. persistent shocks, M sets interest rates
- Funded transfer shocks
 - F borrows & taxes the Rich through time
 - M follows Taylor principle
- Unfunded transfer shocks
 - F does not adjust taxes or debt
 - M accommodates by keeping rates constant, inflation stabilises debt

Core Mechanism

Funded transfer shocks

- Govt debt ↑, will be repaid with future taxes on the Rich
- Rich savings ↑, Poor & Govt debt ↑
 ⇒ anticipation of future taxes/transfers (persistence is important)
- Output ↓, inflation ↓, real rate ↑

Unfunded transfer shocks

- No response by **M** nor taxes
- Inflation ↑, real Govt debt ↓
- Real rate ↓, Rich savings and Poor debt ↓


Quantitative Model


Very rich

- Shocks: discount rate, investment efficiency, loan premium, productivity, wage markup, spending, transfers (permanent/transitory + funded/unfunded), monetary
- Frictions: investment adj. costs, capital utilisation costs, private loan utility, consumption
 + labour + capital taxes, firm operating costs, staggered price + wage setting
- Fiscal inflation & funded vs unfunded Govt debt as in Bianchi, Faccini, Melosi (2023 QJE)

Results


a thought experiment: announced Unfunded \rightarrow Funded policy shift





Results

structural model decompositions



Comments


- Motivation
 - 1. saving glut of the rich
 - 2. federal debt buildup

- (Some) Explanations
 - 1. International macro
 - 2. Fiscal policy
 - 3. Inequality more broadly

The Saving Glut of the Rich


Mian, Straub, Sufi (2025)





(a) Saving by income group

Top lends to Bottom (esp. middle class)




(b) 10 year MA change in net household debt

International Macro

- Other popular explanations for US debt buildup and twin deficits
 - US exhorbitant privilege, conquest of American inflation
- How much of US public & private ↑ is accounted for by domestic vs external borrowing?

International Macro


- Other popular explanations for US debt buildup and twin deficits
 - US exhorbitant privilege, conquest of American inflation
- How much of US public & private ↑ is accounted for by domestic vs external borrowing?
- Domestic & global saving gluts are comparable



US Safe asset demand by Top 1% and RoW Source: Mian, Straub, Sufi (2025)


Fiscal Policy

Larger ↑ in transfers and redistributive policy




Fiscal Policy

Larger ↑ in transfers and redistributive policy



Funded by deficits + social insurance contributions



Key idea of the paper:

- Shift in funding mix from inflation to debt & taxes
- ↑ Tax share of the Top suggests ↑ Progressivity
- Top saves in anticipation of higher future taxes

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Questions

 Mechanism reliance on tax progressivity & redistribution vs non-Ricardian household response to redistribution

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Questions

- 2. Comparison with \\ income/wealth inequality story
 - we should also expect a ↑ tax base of the Top

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
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 - marginal vs average tax rates

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
Piketty and Saez (2007)

Inequality and Saving Rates

Alternative, complementary story:

- Rich get richer (inequality, tax rates)
- Non-homothetic preferences (Straub (2019))
 - ⇒ higher saving rates, higher savings

Figure 6: Saving Rate by wealth percentile over time



Mian, Straub, Sufi (2025)

Conclusion

- First-order question
- Highlighting proposed vs competing mechanisms would help a lot
- Impressive paper!